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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

are familiar between the functions of the jury and those of the Court. It
may do away with the jury altogether, modify its constitution, the requirements of a verdict, or the procedure before it."16
It is difficult to understand why Ohio should be denied the right to
demand that equitable relief first be obtained from a release obtained by
fraud before the cause of action may be brought, in view of the fact
that the federal courts still retain the division of law and equity. It is well
settled that on17 the equity side of the federal courts there is no right to a
trial by jury.
LEGISLATION-SPECIAL STATUTES WITH
CLASSIFICATION BY POPULATION
a
John Gaca, Chicago policeman, brought an action against the City of
Chicago for recovery of a $2300 judgment obtained against him for a false
arrest. He recovered under section i-1 5 , chapter z4, of the Illinois Revised Statutes which provides that in municipalities with a population
of 500,000 or more, policemen shall be indemnified for judgments

recovered against them by reason of non-wilful torts committed while on
duty. His recovery was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. Gaca v.
City of Chicago, 411 Il1. 146, 103 N.E. zd 617 (1952).
Defendant, the City of Chicago, claimed that this statute contravenes
Section 22 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, prohibiting special
statutes granting any special or exclusive privileges, and that it imposes a
tax upon a municipal corporation for corporation purposes, thereby violating Section 1o of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution.
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the statute in spite of a strong dissent. The court said that the classification was reasonable since policemen
in municipalities with populations over 5oo,ooo are fraught with problems
that are not found in the rest of the state. The second argument of the
defendant did not merit an answer.
Municipalities were not liable at common law for the negligent acts of
policemen in the performance of their duties.' Policemen have been individually liable notwithstanding that the tort was committed while on
2

duty.
Although the Illinois Constitution prohibits laws granting special privileges and immunities,8 the courts have seen fit to allow a leeway from the
16 Chicago, R.I. and P.R. Co. v. Cole,

251 U.S. 54 (919).
17 Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 433 (1830). See also, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474 (1934); Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
I Evans v. City of Kankakee, 231 I11. 223, 83 N.E. 223 (19o7).
2 City of Chicago v. Williams, r8z Ill. 135, 55 N.E. 123 (1899); Wisher v. City of
Centralia, 273 I11.App. 168 (1933).
Const. Art. 4, k 22.
1 I11.
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literal meaning of these words. They have said that it is not necessary that
the same rules shall apply to every individual in the state, but only to
those in substantially the same circumstances.4 An act is not local or
special because it operates in but one place or upon a particular class if
there is a reasonable basis for the classification 5 and if it operates upon all
similarly situated.0 Population may be a proper basis of classification in a
statute where it is obvious that density or sparsity of population requires
different remedies and facilities to effect the public purpose. 7
The courts have passed on the validity of many classifications by population.8 Two previous cases dealt with classifications of 5oo,0oo persons.
One held valid the authorization of a working cash fund to be raised by
bonds in counties having a population of over 5oo,ooo, reasoning that this
was only necessary in cities with large populations and big administrations.9 The other held void an authorization for a division of courts in
regard to divorce in judicial circuits of 5o0,0o0 or more inhabitants.1" This
court said that population does not have a direct relation to divorce problems, but that:
There is no substantial difference between problems in that judicial circuit in
these matters and in any other circuit in the state, except as to the greatly increased number of cases. It is true that the dense population of cities... creates
social problems differing from those in a rural community, but the incidents
of divorce and separation of married persons.., are largely the same throughout the state."
4People v. Deatherage, 4oi I1. 25, 81 N.E. 2d 581 (1948); People v. City of Springfield, 370 Il. 541, 19 N.E. zd 598 (939).

5Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 355 Iil. 504, 189 N.E. 907 (1934).
8 People v. Borgeson, 335 Ill. 136, 166 N.E. 45 (1929); People v. Callicott, 322 Ill.
390, 153 N.E. 688 ([9,6).
7 Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 Ill. 25, 95 N.E.
84 (195o); Littell v. City of Peoria,
374 111. 344, 29 N.E. 2d 533 (1940).
2d

8The following cases held valid a classification by population: Littell v. City of
Peoria, 374 I11. 344, 29 N.E. ad 533 (194o); People v. City of Springfield, 370 Ill. 541,
19 N.E.
598 (939); Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 174 N.E. 35 (1930);
People v. Kastings, 307 Ill. 92, 138 N.E. 269 (1923); Hughes v. Traeger, 264 IlL 61z,
2d

io6 N.E. 431 (1914); People v. Grover, 258 Il. 124, io1 N.E. Mx6 (1913); Douglas v.
People, 225 Ill. 536, 8o N.E. 341 (19o7); Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Greer,
M. 104, 79 N.E. 46 0906).
The following cases held void a classification by population: Hunt v. County of
Cook, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E. 2d 48 (1947); People v. Read, 344 Ill. 397, 176 N.E. ±84
385,
(1931); People v. Fox, 247 I. 402, 93 N.E. 302 (191o); Strong v. Dignan, 207 111.
69 N.E. 9o9 (19o4); Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 6± N.E. 215 (19oi); People v.
410, 56 N.E. 155 (9oo); Devine v. Board of Commissioners of Cook
Knopf, 183 111.
County, 84 Il. 590 (1877).
9 Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 174 N.E. 35 (1930) •
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10 Hunt v. County of Cook, 398 1l. 412, 76 N.E. ad 48 (1947).
11 Ibid., at 42o and 53.
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This latter case seems more in point than the case relied upon by the
court, People v. Kastings,12 which held valid an act requiring a $io,ooo
bond for each taxicab in cities of populations of ioo,ooo or more, because
the probabilities of traffic accidents bear a direct relationship to the population. It must be kept in mind that a classification according to population
3
may be valid with one subject matter and not with another.'
Another approach to the problem would be to consider the possible discrimination against policemen not covered by this act. Where a general
law can be made applicable, no special law should be enacted. 1" An act is
invalid if there is no legitimate reason why it is not extended to others not
touched by it.15
It is another problem whether the indemnity for tort liability is such a
thing as will accomplish the objects and purposes intended. It cannot be
said with certainty that there is a direct relationship between this indemnity and the quality of law enforcement in large cities.
The court in the present case stated that the legislature may have sought
to indirectly increase the wages of policemen in the city of Chicago, the
only municipality affected, by relieving them of the expense of insuring
against this risk. But in view of the fact that there is an express statute
dealing with the minimum policemen's wage, it would be more likely that
the legislature would make such a change by an amendment to the
Policemen's Minimum Wage Act. 10
Also the fact that since the municipality will bear the expense of the
act, it may be a tax on a municipal corporation for corporation purposes
such as is forbidden by Section io of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution. Matbezws v. City of Chicago17 discussed this problem and held that
there was no violation if the act applied to all departments of the municipality, but also indicated that there would be a violation if it were for a
specific or particular purpose. Here, the entire city is bearing the cost of
the indemnity to the police department alone.
The burden is on the one alleging the unreasonableness of the classification."' Hence, the legislature has the benefit of the doubt in a classification problem. But since it appears that the difference between police
problems of municipalities of more than 500,000 people and some municipalities of less population are not substantial, that there are policemen in
12 307

I11.92, 138 N.E. 269

(1923).

13 Kales, Special Legislation as Defined in Illinois Cases, 1Ill. L. Rev. 75 (9o6).
14 Hunt v. County of Cook, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E. 2d 48 (1947).
15 Schuman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 407 Ill. 313, 95 N.E. 2d 447 (95o); Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 63 N.E. 2d 851 (1945).
10 I11.
Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 24, §II-2.
17 342 Ill. 120, 138, 174 N.E. 35, 42 (1930).

Is Bagdonas v. Liberty Land and Investment Co., 309 Ifl. 103, 14o N.E. 49 (1923).
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municipalities of less than 500,000 who are similarly situated as those in a

city with more, and that the indemnity to policemen does not promise to
remedy the situation sought to be improved, the doubtful reasonableness
of the classification and the resulting discrimination are such as would
seem to justify a striking of the statute in question.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
NON-CAPITAL CASES
Petitioner, a minor eighteen years of age, pleaded guilty upon arraignment to three indictments of armed robbery and larceny. Plaintiff was
neither offered nor did he receive advice of counsel. A petition for a
writ of habeas corpus was filed on grounds that permitting plaintiff to
plead guilty without advice of counsel is so unfair that it violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In denying the petition,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that there is always a presumption that the court exercised its proper discretion when it allowed a
defendant over seventeen years of age to plead guilty without aid of
counsel, and that this presumption was not overcome. The court concluded that the fair conduct of these matters must depend upon the wisdom and understanding of the trial judge. Fitzgibbons v. Hancock, 82 A.
2d 769 (N.H., 195').
Under the Sixth Amendment 2 the right to the appointment of counsel
in any federal criminal case is absolute where the benefit of counsel has
not been waived. 3 However, the rule's counterpart, the right ot counsel in
state cases, has remained uncertain. Earlier cases attempted to make a distinction between capital and non-capital state crimes, but the severity of
punishment in non-capital cases and the lack of a definite rule even
as to capital cases caused this distinction to suffer harsh criticism.4 The

first semblance of any concrete rule for the states was presented in the
case of Betts v. Brady.5 The petitioner in that case, forty-three years of
age and of average intelligence, was convicted of robbery after his request
for counsel was denied. A petition for habeas corpus was denied on the
grounds that the Sixth Amendment guarantee was good only in federal
cases.
The Betts case established the fundamental rule for determining whether
I U.S. Const. Amend.

14.

2

U.S. Const. Amend. 6.

3 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4 Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471
(194S); Odom v. State, 2o5 Miss. 572, 37 So. 2d 300 (1948); State v. Hedgebeth,
228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E. 2d 563 (1947); Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d 671 (1941);
Watson v. State, 142 Fla. 218, 194 So-64o (1940).
5

P6 U.S. 455 (1942)"

